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Introduction
Central  Asia  faces  a  broad  range  of 
security challenges1. Due to the region’s 
position at the crossroads between Russia, 
China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the 
Caspian Sea it is confronted with a range 
of  trans-national  issues  such  as  drug 
trafficking,  human  trafficking,  organised 
crime  and  terrorism.  Central  Asia  also 
encounters  specific  regional  threats 
including scarcity of water resources for 
generating power and irrigation purposes, 
which  is  currently  causing  tension.  On 
a  national  level  the  five  Central  Asian 
republics face the threat of instability due 
to bad governance and the harsh impact 
of the economic crisis. 
Although  the  Central  Asian  republics 
established  themselves  as  independent 
states  with  reasonably  strong  security 
forces  and  multi-vector  foreign  policies, 
they are largely dependent on influential 
external  actors’  cooperation  on  security 
issues. Home-grown Central Asia security 
cooperation mechanisms are nonexistent. 
NATO  includes  the  Central  Asian 
republics in its Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme; Russia leads the Collective 
1   A similar version of this text will also appear 
in a Centre for European Security Studies 
(CESS) Harmonie Paper, www.cess.org
Security  Treaty  Organisation  (CSTO) 
whose  membership  consists  of  several 
former Soviet republics; China and Russia 
work with Central Asian republics through 
the  Shanghai  Cooperation  Organisation 
(SCO). Clearly Russia is the main security 
actor  in  the  region.  It  became  clear  in 
August  2008  that  Russia  is  willing  and 
able  to  act  with  military  means  in  its 
‘near  abroad’  for  better  or  worse.  This 
notion was strengthened in August 2009 
when President Medvedev amended the 
Defence  Law  to  create  the  possibility 
of  deploying  Russian  forces  abroad  to 
defend Russian interests. In the case of 
conflict in Central Asia, it is highly unlikely 
that China, the EU and the US would act, 
even though the latter two have several 
military bases in the area focusing on the 
war effort in Afghanistan.
The  European  Union  does  however 
regard  itself  as  a  security  actor  and 
takes  a  keen  interest  in  working  with 
Central Asian states on the basis of joint 
security  interests.  In  June  2007  when 
the  EU  presented  the  ‘European  Union 
and  Central  Asia:  Strategy  for  a  New 
Partnership’ document,2 Brussels argued 
2   The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New 
Partnership  (June  2007),  http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EU_
CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf
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Thus much of the activity from political dialogue to assistance 
programmes is part of the Strategy’s security objective. One 
security  aspect  that  is  key  to  both  national  security  and 
international and regional security cooperation is the concept 
of Security Sector Reform (SSR), which aims to support a 
locally  driven  reform  effort  of  all  national  security-related 
agencies and oversight mechanisms. Although the EU policy 
documents concerning Central Asia do not refer to SSR, this 
paper will argue that some EU activities can be directly related 
to the holistic concept of SSR and others might contribute 
indirectly to reform of the security sector.
This EUCAM policy brief assesses in what aspects of Security 
Sector Reform the EU is engaged in with Central Asia and 
in what context these possible activities should be viewed. 
The main focus will be on direct engagement on security 
topics such as the EU Border Management project BOMCA. 
However, indirect activities such as education programmes 
that might be beneficial to security and stability in Central Asia 
will not be ignored. After an exposé on EU security interests in 
Central Asia, in the second paragraph attention is devoted to 
national and regional threats to the security of Central Asian 
republics and engagement of the EU. The paper concludes 
with a few recommendations for EU institutions and member 
states that could help to strengthen EU–Central Asia security 
cooperation including aspects of Security Sector Reform. 
1. The EU and Security in Central Asia
The 2007 EU–Central Asia Strategy argues that the EU has 
an interest in security, stability, human rights and rule of law 
in  Central Asia  because  of  trans-regional  challenges;  EU 
enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
that brought Europe and Central Asia closer; and the region’s 
substantial energy resources that can help to build EU energy 
security.3 Of the seven specific priorities outlined, number six 
is the most tangible direct security item: ‘combating common 
threats and challenges’. Here the EU offers to further work 
with Central Asia on border management and customs in 
order to counter crime and the challenge of migration flows 
through and from the region. The Strategy called for a series 
of high-level visits of Central Asian leaders to Europe and 
visa versa. In September 2008 the French EU Presidency 
organised a Minister of Foreign Affairs level security Forum 
that focused on Afghanistan, terrorist threats and trafficking, 
and the Swedish Presidency followed up on this event one 
year later with a Ministerial Conference discussing regional 
security issues, water, energy and the impact of the economic 
crisis.  Meanwhile,  Solana’s  Special  Representative  Pierre 
Morel travels through the region with an obvious energy and 
security portfolio and the EU holds regular Human Rights 
Dialogues with all Central Asian republics. 
Through the European Commission, a Regional Assistance 
3   Ibidem.
Strategy  (2007–2013)4  and  a  more  detailed  Indicative 
Programme  (2007–2011)5  were  drafted  to  guide  technical 
assistance. One third of the 750 million Euro assistance until 
2013  is  earmarked  for  regional  cooperation  programmes; 
two thirds is for bilateral programmes. The funding is thinly 
spread over the wide range of priorities outlined in the political 
Strategy and many touch on security-related issues. Only 
the  BOMCA  border  management  and  CADAP  anti-drugs 
trafficking  programme  are  directly  security  related  while 
several  bilateral  programmes  that  focus  on  the  judiciary, 
parliament or ministries should have a positive impact on 
security and stability in the EU’s philosophy. In that sense 
the  regional  EU  Rule  of  Law  Initiative  that  is  coordinated 
by Germany and France might also have a positive bearing 
on Central Asian regional cooperation and security through 
reform of the rule of law. Still, only a little of the EU’s technical 
assistance through the Development Cooperation Instrument 
(DCI) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR) – the two main EU assistance instruments 
that apply to Central Asia – can be regarded as Security 
Sector Reform assistance. However, some initiatives, such 
as a project on human rights awareness in the Kyrgyz police 
forces  or  assistance  to  judicial  reform  in  Kyrgyzstan  and 
Kazakhstan are part and parcel of SSR,6 although maybe not 
presented directly in this way by Brussels. The EU Instrument 
for Stability (IfS) that would be suitable for SSR work until 
now barely applies to Central Asia.
Although the EU does not have a SSR strategy for Central 
Asia, the EU in general has become one of the foremost 
international  donors  and  promoters  of  SSR  through 
Commission funding and long-term projects, and EU Council-
driven European Security and Defence (ESDP) missions in 
Afghanistan, Africa, the Balkans, South Caucasus and the 
Middle East. The main focus of EU SSR is on police forces, 
border guards and the judiciary, generally excluding reform 
of the military. Division of labour and coordination between 
the Commission and Council is however weak and ill-defined 
– sometimes even leading to competition of competences in 
implementing programmes – which is partly the result of the 
fact that both EU entities have their own SSR Concept.7 The 
EU sees SSR as a tool that can help reach broad objectives 
of the Union’s external and security policies such as poverty 
reduction  and  strengthening  human  rights,  democracy, 
good governance and rule of law. Finally, Brussels devotes 
attention to SSR in fragile states as outlined in the 2003 EU 
4   European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to 
Central Asia for the period 2007–2013, http://ec.europa.eu/external_
relations/central_asia/rsp/07_13_en.pdf
5   Central Asia Indicative Programme (2007–2010), http://ec.europa.
eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/nip_07_10_en.pdf
6   Presentation by Joaquin Tasso Vilallonga, SSR Focal Point, Crisis 
Response and Peace Building Unit, RELEX, European Commission 
during  the  conference:  SSR  in  Central  Asia:  ‘Identifying  national 
approaches, international involvement and prospects for cooperation’, 
24–25 September 2009, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
7   Maria Derks and Sylvie More, ‘The European Union and Internal 
Challenges  for  Effectively  Supporting  Security  Sector  Reform’, 
Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, June 2009, v.
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Whereas the Commission is involved in assistance that is 
SSR or can be linked to reform of the security sector in Central 
Asia, and is expanding its presence on the ground through 
Commission delegations in Astana, Bishkek and Dushanbe, a 
cooperation office in Almaty and Europe Houses in Ashgabat 
and Tashkent, the Council is only represented through Special 
Representative Pierre Morel with few staff actually present in 
the region. With no ESDP missions active in a region beset 
by a range of security challenges, it would make sense for 
the Special Representative to discuss possible EU–Central 
Asia cooperation on SSR in his regular meetings with Central 
Asian  political  elites.  Security  structures  in  Central  Asia 
are characterised by a lack of training and resources (the 
Armed Forces in particular), corruption (for example in the 
police forces) and absence of oversight mechanisms besides 
presidential power (internal security forces and intelligence 
come to mind). If the EU is serious about promoting stability 
and security in the region, and sees political dialogue as the 
basis of engagement, the Special Representative should at 
least test the waters in all five countries. It is unlikely that 
he  would  receive  any  interest  from  Turkmen  and  Uzbek 
authorities but he might find an opening for cooperation in the 
somewhat more liberal regimes of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. 
A final aspect of EU engagement in SSR in Central Asia can 
be related to the OSCE and NATO due to the large overlap 
of  membership  and  both  regional  security  organisations’ 
activities  in  Central  Asia.  Cooperation  between  the  EU 
and  NATO  is  limited  in  Central  Asia  and  non-existent 
when it comes to SSR. All five countries are members of 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), but only Kazakhstan 
is actively engaged in SSR activities through the Individual 
Partnership Action  Plan  (IPAP)  that  it  agreed  with  NATO 
and  which  incorporates  aspects  of  security-related  reform 
of  armed  forces  and  oversight  mechanisms.  Kazakhstan 
also participates in the PAP-DIB (Partnership Action Plan – 
Defence Institution Building) initiative in which NATO liaises 
with  partners  from  Eastern  Europe,  the  South  Caucasus 
and Kazakhstan on good governance of the defence sector. 
NATO holds consultations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on 
defence and security sector reform, but is not directly involved 
through substantial cooperation or assistance programming. 
NATO’s interest in Central Asia largely equals that of the EU 
– partnership, stability and security – but its activities are 
mostly constrained to some military cooperation and, most 
importantly, political dialogue and diplomatic exchanges with 
a view to increase access to Afghanistan for NATO’s ISAF 
mission. 
The OSCE is an interesting partner for the EU in Central Asia 
in terms of SSR activities. The OSCE has a presence in all 
five countries and has broad experience of ‘doing’ SSR, both 
8   ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy’, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsUpload/78367.pdf 
through  the  politico-military  and  human  dimensions.  Over 
70 per cent of the OSCE budget is funded by EU member 
states, most of them in full support of OSCE field missions, 
although the OSCE centres in Central Asia only have small 
budgets. One way for the EU to step up support for SSR in 
Central Asia would be to provide so-called ‘extra budgetary 
support’ to projects that can be implemented by the OSCE; 
this would be advantageous since Central Asian countries 
themselves are members of the OSCE and thus have a stake 
in the defining and implementation of SSR activities. Although 
some Central Asian countries, particularly Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, would be unwilling to have the OSCE work on 
democratisation of the security sector, the other three states 
are more open to this. But there are also less sensitive SSR-
related issues the OSCE works on in Central Asia, such as 
police and border guard training. And these are areas where 
the EU and OSCE need to carefully coordinate and cooperate 
since the EU also tends to focus on these areas in support 
of SSR. In that sense close cooperation is expected between 
the  EU  BOMCA  project  and  the  newly  opened  Border 
Management Staff Office in Dushanbe. Another option for 
cooperation could be education through the OSCE Academy 
in Bishkek and several education initiatives that the EU is 
undertaking in the region. Lastly, the Kazakh 2010 OSCE 
Chairmanship is another opportunity for the EU and OSCE to 
step up engagement with Central Asia, including cooperation 
on reforming the security sector.  
2. Security threats and EU activity
Central Asia  is  confronted  by  trans-national,  regional  and 
national  security  threats.  The  main  trans-national  threat 
derives from Afghanistan in the form of drug trafficking and 
the risk of conflict spilling over as Taliban factions try to get a 
foothold in Central Asia.9 In Afghanistan the EU is increasingly 
active in support of SSR. The main programmes consist of an 
ESDP police mission (EUPOL) and Commission involvement 
in  justice  reform.  Europe’s  SSR  support  is  largely  still 
provided by individual member states – especially those that 
contribute to the ISAF mission – and the EU’s programmes 
are  still  in  need  of  more  funding  and  qualified  personnel. 
The main link between EU SSR support to Afghanistan and 
Central Asia is border control, for instance through the Border 
Management Badakhshan (BOMBAF) that was largely EU 
funded,  implemented  by  UNDP  and  focused  on  building 
three border crossing points on the Tajik-Afghan border while 
also training Afghan border guards and providing equipment. 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share a border with 
Afghanistan that is over 2000 kilometres long. In Central Asia 
the  Commission  has  supported  the  Border  Management 
programme  BOMCA10  and  a  Drug  Action  Programme 
9   For more information about the EU security role in Afghanistan and 
Central Asia see: Nicolás de Pedro and Gabriel Reyes, ‘Central Asia 
and  the  European  Union  Strategy  for Afghanistan’,  EUCAM  Policy 
Brief. Soon available at www.eucentralasia.eu 
10   For more information about BOMCA see: George Gavrilis, ‘BOMCA 
and  beyond.  The  Geography  of  Euroepan  Border  Management 
Assistance in Central Asia’, EUCAM Policy Brief. Soon available at 
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funded and UNDP-implemented programmes are heralded 
as EU flagship projects in the region. BOMCA has focused 
on training Central Asian border guards, providing technical 
equipment  and  facilitating  regional  cooperation  on  border 
management. The main objective is to promote integrated 
border management that would help all agencies involved 
(border  guards,  customs  services,  police  etc.)  to  work 
closely together but also enhance contacts between these 
agencies among the Central Asian countries. Regardless of 
its success, the challenges in border control in Central Asia 
and the borders with Afghanistan remain enormous. The EU 
would do well to step up BOMCA work through increased 
funding, bringing in more partners and, in a broader sense, 
using the BOMCA experience in other parts of the security 
sector such as police or disaster relief. 
The  most  substantial  regional  threat  facing  Central  Asia 
derives from tensions over water management. Energy-rich 
Kazakhstan,  Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan  lack  sufficient 
water resources for irrigation of crops, while mountainous 
and water-rich Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lack sufficient fossil 
fuel resources. Over the past few years tensions have risen 
between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in particular. The former 
plans to construct an enormous dam in the Vakhsh River 
which  would  enable  the  Tajiks  to  generate  the  electricity 
they badly need while being able to control water flows to 
Uzbekistan  and  other  countries  in  the  region.  Uzbekistan 
fiercely resists Tajik water projects, fearing that it would not 
have  enough  water  to  irrigate  its  extensive  cotton  fields. 
Uzbekistan has already on a few occasions restricted the 
flow of gas to Tajikistan. Regional cooperation between the 
Central Asian countries has not yielded substantial results, 
and international organisations and important powers such 
as Russia, the EU and the US have been reluctant to get 
involved  in  regional  disputes  over  water  resources.  With 
climate change having a further negative effect on available 
water resources, the risk of regional conflict rises, especially 
between Uzbekistan and its water-rich though devastatingly 
poor Tajik and Kyrgyz neighbours. The EU is involved in water 
management  issues  through  an  Initiative  on  Environment 
and  Water  which  is  aimed  at  donor  coordination. A  large 
water governance project is one of the key projects the EU 
is  implementing,  although  unfortunately  Uzbekistan  is  not 
included.  Although  maybe  not  directly  SSR  related,  this 
EU engagement in good governance on topics that have a 
clear security bearing is crucial to the implementation of the 
security-oriented Strategy for the region.
Lastly, the countries of the region deal with internal instability 
to different extents. At first sight all five regimes seem to have 
a strong grip on power. However, strong presidential regimes 
or authoritarianism are no guarantee for staying in power as 
became clear in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 when President Akayev 
was ousted by frustrated elites in favour of current President 
Bakiyev. Also it is unclear whether power transitions as a 
www.eucentralasia.eu
result of a leader’s sudden death will always run as smoothly 
as in Turkmenistan following Niazov’s death in December 
2006.  Disloyal  political  and  business  elites,  the  poor  and 
disillusioned populations – an effect that might be increased 
by the economic crisis – as well as radical Islamic groups 
can all threaten the status quo in Central Asian republics. 
These  factors  provide  reason  enough  for  Central  Asian 
leaders to have strong intelligence services that can detect 
potential threats in time, or internal security forces that can 
quell unrest if necessary. An extreme example of when such 
services were deployed was the situation that arose in the 
Uzbek city of Andjion in 2004, where hundreds of protesters 
where  massacred.  In  this  sense  SSR,  if  understood  by 
Central Asian leaders as contributing to democratic reform 
of security structures, is likely to be considered a threat to 
the regime. 
Although all five Central Asian states have strong presidential 
regimes  there  are  substantial  differences  between  the 
leaderships, the conditions they work in, the level of freedom 
and the possibilities for reform. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and  Tajikistan  there  might  be  interest  in  EU-supported 
small scale projects on SSR that touch on governance and 
even democratisation aspects. Large overhaul projects are 
unlikely but smaller civil society driven projects, with support 
through EIDHR, the Non State Actors / Local Authorities in 
Development programme and especially through EU national 
government  funding,  should  be  taken  up  and  supported. 
In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan prospects are dim for EU 
involvement in SSR and governance support. Nonetheless, 
the EU should make an effort to closely liaise with NATO, 
which  upholds  reasonably  positive  diplomatic  and  military 
contacts with these countries. Cooperation with the OSCE 
Project  Coordinator  in Tashkent  and  the  OSCE  Centre  in 
Ashgabat could also yield success, for instance in the form of 
jointly organising modest public discussion sessions. 
Radical  Islam  is  characterised  by  most  Central  Asian 
governments as internal security threat number one. Until 
now  the  EU  has  been  wary  of  initiating  EU–Central Asia 
exchanges of experience in working on and with moderate 
Islamic groups on society- related issues, including security. 
In the EU–Central Asia Strategy the final priority outlined is 
‘Building Bridges: inter-cultural dialogue’.11 In its June 2008 
and summer 2009 reports the Council and Commission did 
not even bother to address this point.12 Although not directly 
related to SSR, both moderate and radical Islam are societal 
forces to be reckoned with; the former to build a dialogue with, 
the latter, if violent, to address through security services. The 
EU should outline what it plans to do regarding this Strategy 
11   The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership (June 
2007), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/
EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf, 26.
12   Joint Progress Report by the Council and the European Commission 
to the European Council on the Implementation of the EU Central Asia 
Strategy,  2008,  http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/images/Strategy/
joint%20progress%20report%20on%20eu%20ca%20strategy.pdf  and 
the EU Strategy Implementation, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/external_
relations/central_asia/docs/factsheet_strategy_implementation_en.pdf 
4  EUCAM Policy Brief No. 10priority, with a view to helping to build stability and enhance 
mutual security. 
3. Recommendations for the EU institutions 
and member states
A strong EU involvement including a unified vision in support 
of Security Sector Reform in Central Asia is unlikely in the 
foreseeable future. The political landscape in Central Asia 
is  largely  not  receptive  to  key  aspects  of  SSR  such  as 
democratic control of armed forces and other state security 
institutions through the power ministries, the parliament and 
civil society. Nonetheless the EU is active in aspects of SSR 
and there is probably room for growth of this modest role. 
Here are a few options EU institutions and member states 
might consider:
Although the EU Strategy’s underlying theme is based  •	
on security, it would be worthwhile to look into ways of 
feeding SSR aspects into the political dialogue between 
the EU and Central Asian republics. Firstly, the Special 
Representative Pierre Morel and his team of advisors 
could investigate in meetings with Central Asian leaders 
if there are aspects of SSR that the republics might take 
an interest in. EU Council advisors could for instance be 
helpful in Central Asia on issues such as legal advice to 
help reform security structures. 
The EU does not implement significant SSR programmes  •	
in  Central  Asian  states,  with  BOMCA  largely  being 
coordinated by UNDP. Increased political and financial 
support  is  feasible  however,  for  instance  through  the 
OSCE.  Supporting  the  OSCE  field  offices  with  extra-
budgetary funds for specific projects would be an ideal 
way for the EU to get involved in SSR through a joint 
effort of OSCE member states and by using OSCE ‘eyes 
and ears’ on the ground.
The EU will need to take a broad approach to security  •	
concerns that go beyond narrowly-defined regions such 
as Central Asia and conflict areas such as Afghanistan 
and  Pakistan.  It  will  be  imperative  for  Brussels  and 
its  EU  programmes  on  the  ground  to  liaise  closely 
with each other and even integrate activities that take 
place in Central Asia and Afghanistan. This principally 
applies  to  the  BOMCA  and  CADAP  programmes  that 
need  to  further  expand  on  ‘cross-border’  international 
border management assistance programmes between 
Afghanistan and the Central Asian states.
In most assessments BOMCA receives a positive review.  •	
The fact that all five Central Asian countries participate 
in  this  regional  endeavour  is  already  an  important 
achievement. It would be worthwhile to use the experience 
to try and transfer the BOMCA model to other parts of the 
security sector in Central Asia. The EU could consider 
applying the integrated (border management) approach 
to (less politically sensitive) sectors such as emergency 
response which also demands the involvement of a host 
of  security  services  and  ministries  that  need  to  work 
closely together in times of need.
In  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan  and Tajikistan  there  might  •	
be interest in EU supported projects on SSR. The EU 
and  its  member  states  could  increasingly  look  into 
possibilities  of  supporting  SSR  projects  implemented 
by  local  and  international  civil  society  organisations, 
also in cooperation with the governments of the three 
countries. 
In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan prospects are largely  •	
absent  for  a  substantial  EU  involvement  in  SSR  that 
goes beyond current work in BOMCA. Nonetheless, the 
EU should make an effort to closely liaise with NATO 
and  the  OSCE,  also  in  practical  terms  through  small 
awareness-raising exercises. 
With regard to Islam and society, the EU should pick up  •	
on EU Strategy priority number seven ‘Building Bridges: 
inter-cultural  dialogue’,  making  clear  what  it  plans  to 
undertake  in  terms  of  helping  to  build  stability  and 
enhance mutual security. 
Conclusion
While  the  EU  will  not  be  an  influential  player  in  security 
issues nor in assistance to SSR as it has been in the Western 
Balkans, or currently in Congo and Georgia, there is room for 
a more concerted and substantial role. In the security domain 
it will be crucial for the EU to link up efforts and partners in 
Afghanistan to those in Central Asia. The political dialogue 
with Central Asian republics that was intensified as a result 
of the appearance of the 2007 EU Strategy for the region 
should now bear fruit in that sense. These increased contacts 
and engagement could also have a positive impact on water 
management  tensions  in  the  region,  especially  between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
As far as SSR goes, the EU has little room to fund or work 
on  genuine  SSR  projects  with  a  strong  good  governance 
focus. Nonetheless, Brussels and member states should use 
the opportunities that are available; especially since SSR is 
the ideal link between the human rights, democracy, good 
governance and rule of law priority it has set out to pursue 
and the security concerns that underpin EU engagement with 
Central Asia.
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themes  identified  above,  with  other  papers  commissioned  in  response  to 
emerging areas beyond the main themes.
 - Commentaries on the evolving partnership between the EU and the states 
of Central Asia will be commissioned reflecting specific developments in the 
EU-Central Asian relationship. 
  - A  final  monitoring  report  of  the  EUCAM  Expert  Working  Group  will  be 
produced by the project rapporteurs. 
This  monitoring  exercise  is  implemented  by  an  Expert  Working  Group, 
established by FRIDE and CEPS. The group consists of experts from the 
Central Asian states and the members countries of the EU. In addition to 
expert  meetings,  several  public  seminars  will  be  organised  for  a  broad 
audience including EU representatives, national officials and legislators, the 
local civil society community, media and other stakeholders. 
EUCAM  is  sponsored  by  the  Open  Society  Institute  (OSI)  and  the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project is also supported 
by the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.
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